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Abstract
This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe.
The oligopoly is assumed to consist of Egypt, Oman, Mexico, Malaysia and
Norway plus all OPEC members. The remaining oil producing countries are
included in a fringe which by assumption takes the oil price development as
exogenously given. Outcomes with varying degrees of collusion within the
oligopoly are specified. Intermediate cases are also studied, such as complete
or partial cooperation within OPEC, but no cooperation between OPEC and
any other countries in the oligopoly. The model is implemented in the PC-
based MODLER software, and empirical results from the simulations on the
different model versions are presented.
Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome.
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1 Introduction
The future price development for oil will depend on to what extent the OPEC
members are able to coordinate their production decisions, and to what extent
OPEC succeeds in cooperating with other major oil producers. Many countries
both inside and outside OPEC will suffer through large reductions in incomes by
a fail in the oil price as a result of breakdown of OPEC. This obviously forms
the background for the fact that some countries outside the organization have
found it beneficial to negotiate with OPEC it order to support OPEC's control
over the market. For each agent in the market this kind of agreement must be
weighted against the benefits of being a "free rider" in the market. The question
of benefits from cooperation with OPEC from the point of view of Mexico and
Norway is- discussed in Berger, Bjerkholt and Olsen (1987). This analysis used a
simple partial equilibrium model (WOM) for the international oil market as its
point of departure, and the issue of cooperation was then approached by different
assumptions of exogenous oil supplies from different regions. Thus, no formal
behavioural relations on the supply side of the oil market were underlying these
simulations. Even though it may be questioned whether a formal cartel model
is suited for fitting the obviously complex relations in the international crude oil
market, we still believe that a more formal analysis is useful as a supplement of
understanding present and future development in the market.
This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe.
Consistent with the reasoning in Berger et al. (op. cit) we assume that Egypt,
Oman, Mexico, Malaysia and Norway are the oil producers outside OPEC which
are most likely to cooperate with OPEC. The oligopoly is thus rammed to consist
of these countries plus all OPEC members. The remaining oil producing countries
are included in a fringe which by assumption takes the oil price development
as exogenously given. We consider outcomes with varying degrees of collusion
within the oligopoly. One extreme case is characterized by a complete breakdown
of cooperation within the oligopoly. In this case we assume that the Cournot
solution is the market outcome. The opposite extreme is the situation where all
countries in the oligopoly cbordinate their production decisions so that the total
profit of the oligopoly is maximized. We also consider intermediate ca lms, such
as complete or partial cooperation within OPEC, but no cooperation between
OPEC and any other countries in the oligopoly.
The net demand for crude oil which the oligopoly is facing is roughly consis-
tent with demand and supply relations in the WOM model. The procedure for
calibrating net oil demand in the present framework will be outlined below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section limi-
tations of the theoretical framework will be briefly discussed. Section 3 and 4
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describe our assumptions about totil demand for oil and the supply of oil from the
competitive fringe. Section 5 briefly surveys the cost functions of the oligopoly
members. In section 6 we present the specific theoretical models that are im-
plemented. and tested empirically, comprising both the pure Cournot solution
and cases with varying degrees og collusion between oligopoly members. Epirical
results from simulations on the different model versions are given in section 7.
Finally, some concluding comments are given in section 8.
2 Restricting the theoretical framework
Throughout this paper we have ignored the fact that oil is a depletable resource.
There are two reaions for doing this. The fast reason is that we want the model
to be as simple and easy to use as possible. It is well known from the literature
(see e.g. Newbery (1981)) on exhaustible resources that it is quite difficult to
derive numerical solutions to several of the possible solution concepts in oligopoly
models of exhaustible resources. Our model framework is intended to be a tool for
planners in Norwegian government agencies, oil companies etc. For this purpose
the structure of the model must be reasonably simple, and its mechanisms must
be well understood by the users.
A second reason for ignoring the fact that oil is depletable is that all Hotelling
types of models force us to specify the appropriate interest rate for each country.
It is not obvious that the countries use interest rates-from international financial
markets in their considerations about how much oil they should extract at differ-
ent points of time. Moreover, international interest rates may depend on OPEC
behaviour. This makes the intertemporal decision problems of OPEC-countries
even more complex than they are with exogenous interest rate (see e.g. Hoel
(1981)). By simply ignoring the depletion issue, from a strictly formal point of
view we obtain results corresponding to producers having an infinite interest rate.
Since high interest rates tend to increase extraction and reduce prices under all
market structures, the fact that we ignore the exhaustibility of oil implies that
we tend to overestimate production and underestimate price in our model.
We shall also disregard intertemporal aspects of demand and supply func-
tions. In reality, price changes only gradually affect demand and fringe supply.
This meant; that price changes will only gradually affect the residual demand
facing the oligopoly. Our model uses long run demand and supply functions,
i.e. we restrict ourselves to long run equilibria. This also means that we as-
sume that participants in the oligopoly only consider long run consequences of
alternative production levels. If oligopoly members have a positive interest rate,
rational behaviour implies that both short and long run effects will be considered
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when agents choose their optimal production strategy (see e.g. Hnyilkza and
Pindyc.k (1976)). By completely ignoring short run considerations, we thus tend
to overestimate production and underestimate price in our model, since short
run elasticities are smaller than long run elasticities (in absolute value). Our
predicted prices may thus be biased downwards due both to our ignoring of the
fact that oil is depletable and because we only consider long run elasticities in
our description of the behaviour of the oligopoly members.
However, a couple of other features of the model specification tend to over-
estimate prices, especially in the long run. Firstly, in the model simulations
capacities of oligopoly members are kept constant, pushing up marginal costs as
demand and production pow. Secondly, in the calculations we have disregarded
from the influences of increased substitutability in the oil market, represented in
its purest form of the presence of a back-stop technology. Altogether, one may
say that our model introduces a negative bias on prices in the short to medium
run, but tend to overestimate prices in the long run.
In the present version of our model, capacity limits of all oligopoly members
are exogenous. For a long run analysis this is clearly unsatisfactory. In a later
version of our model we plan to endogenize production capacities. The simplest
way of doing this is to use long run cost functions, which include the cost of
capacity expansion.. An alternative procedure is to model the oligopoly market
as a two stage game. In the first stage, the capacity of each country is determined
as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. The second stage of the game
may be modeled in a similar way as will be described in the following, i.e. with
exogenous capacity. The capacity chosen in the first stage will affect the outcome
in the second stage and consequently the payoff to each player. The relationshsig
between capacities and payoffs will depend on the degree of collusion in the second
stage of the game. One way of modeling the capacity decisions in the first stage
is to assume that the players have subjective probability distributions over the
different market structures which may arise in the second stage of the game.
However, as mentioned above, so far we treat production capacities as exoge-
nous in the model, and we now proceed to explain this framework.
3 The demand for oil
Total world oil demand (outside the East Bloc and China) in the oligopoly model
is specified as
D = D(P, Zd) 	 (1)
P is the oil price in (real) dollars. Zd is a vector of exogenous factors, in-
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chiding income levels in different countries, real exchange rates, and prices of
other energy sources. As mentioned in the introduction, (1) is derived from the
WOM model. More specifically, D is the sum of the oil demand of three regions
in WOM, namely USA, the rest of OECD, and the LDC's. In each region i
(i = USA, OECD, LDC) oil demand is given by
= AiXtP:iQr (2)
where Xi is GNP, Pi is the real price of oil products (in local currency), Qi is
an index representing the real price of alternative energy, and Ai is an exogenous
variable expressing the effects of all other exogenous factors, including a possible
time trend. The oil price in local currency is
Pi = (IMP + (1 — 'MCA (3)
where ri is the real exchange rate (rusA = 1), Ci is the cost (in local cus-
rency) of transportation, refining, distribution and storage of oil products, and
Ti represents the tax wedge due to indirect taxes on oil products.
Notice that there are no time lags in our demand function (2), as opposed to
the WOM model wher there is a Koyck lag structure on price responses. This
means that the demand elasticities A, ei and ;hi in (2) must be interpreted as
long run elasticities. We have used the following elasticities in our analysis:
USA OECD LDC '
GNP elasticity (/3i) 0.70 0.80 4 1.00 4
Oil price elasticity (4) -0.93 -0.91 -0.37
Price elasticity of
alternative energy (p,i ) 0.20 0.37 0.40
Since the variables Ai, Xi, Qi, r, C, Ti, are exogenous in our analysis, we
may summarize (2) and (3) and derive D = Di , yielding (1).
4' Oil supply from countries outside the oligopoly
Total world supply from the countries outside the oligopoly (including nt exports
from the East Bloc) is specified as
S = S(P, Z.)	 (4)
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In our specification, the only exogenous factor in the supply function (Le. in
Z. in (4)) is a time trend. The time trend is included to represent a gradually
declining supply, for a constant oil price, due to depletion.
More specifically, (4) can be thought of as derived from a supply function
	(t) = S (P (t) , R(t))	 (5)
where R(t) is cumulative extraction. (In order to avoid any misunderstanding,
we include the time dependency of the variables in this part of our analysis.) We
assume that asiap› 0 and asiaR< O.
The development of R(r) is given by
	
it(r) = S (P (r) , R(r))	 (6)
If the time path of P(r) for r E [0, ti was known, R(t) would follow from the
differential equation (6) and the initial value .R4 (= R(0), with t = 0 being the
base year) of cumulative extraction.
Our model is designed to give a description of the oil market at some future
date, e.g. year 2000 or 2010. The model - is not intended to give a full intertem-
poral description of possible oil price developments. In order to motivate (4) we
may thus just as well assume a certain structure of the oil price development
from the base year 0 to our prediction year, in which case P(r) follows from Po,
P(t) and t. An example of this is an oil price path with a constant growth rate,
yielding P (r) = Po(P (t) I For . But if P(r) is completely determined by Po P (t)




Inserting (7) into (5) gives
= (P, t(P , Po, t Ron
or
S = S (P,t)	 (8)
where we have omitted Po and Ro, since they are fixed throughout our anal-
The resulting supply function (8) is identical to (5), except that the general
vector of exogenous factors in (5) is substituted by the specific time trend in (8).




where B is a constant term. This supply equation is calibrated in the following
way: In the WOM model a submodel is specified for the group of producers
outside OPEC. In this submodel oil production from these countries are related to
various concepts of oil reserves, and exploration and extraction of these reserves
are depending on the (expected) oil price. For given assumptions of the oil
price and other independent variables this submodel is simulated a number of
years ahead (until 2000), yielding non- OPEC supply for varying combinations
of explanatory variables. The resulting set of "synthetic" data are then used for
estimating the simpler supply behaviour in the oligopoly model represented by
(9). Given that we "believe" in the supply structure in the WOM model, this
may seem as a reasonable procedure.
The supply elasticity o is by this procedure estimated to 0.117 , and the time
trend parameter obtained is -0.008.
5 Demand and cost functions of the oligopoly
The participants of the oligopoly are all of the OPEC countries plus Egypt,
Oman, Mexico, Malaysia and Norway. The remainin' g oil producing countries
are included in a competitive fringe.
The residual demand facing the oligopoly is
E =	 = D(P, Zd) 	 Z.)	 (10)
Z represents all exogenous factors influencing net demand. At some stages of
our analysis it is convenient to invert the demand function E(P, Z), giving
	= P(E, Z)	 (11)
Each member of the oligopoly has a cost function
	c i = (Xi)	 (12)
where Ci are total costs and Xi is production.
In our main analysis we assume that the capacity (Ki) of each member of the
oligopoly is exogenous. The cost functions are then specified as
ci = 	 giPri + (Ki — Xi) In Ki Xi 1
	
(13)




Ca. = — ln 	 (14)
Marginal costs thus lie above e.i for all xi 0, and go to infinity as production
(Xi) approaches the capacity limit (Ki). The smaller the positive parameter gi
is, the closer to an "inverse L" is the marginal cost function.
6 Different behavioural models for the oligopoly
6.1 The oil market as a Cournot oligopoly
With no collusion between the oligopoly members, we assume that the outcome




	EXi = E	 (16)
Equations (11), (15) and (16) are n -I- 2 equations detenninin' g production
(Xi) of each of the n oligopoly members and the oil price (P), as well as total
oligopoly production (E = xi).
6.2 Collusion in the oil oligopoly
Assume that a group I of the oligopoly members collude, while the remaining
members (group .7) act as Cournot oligopolists. If the colluding group acts as a
profit maximizing cartel with side payments, it chooses production levels so that
apP (EXi)—
E
 5. Cis, i E	 (17)
a
where (17) and X > 0 hold with complementary slackness. (17) consists of
ni equations. For the nj = n — ni non-colluding oligopoly members our previous
equations (15) remain valid. Equations (11) and (16) are valid also for the present
case, so that we again have n + 2 equations determining Xi, E and P.
A crucial question is how many and which members who choose to collude.
This problem is not approached in a formal manner in the present paper. A
possible procedure would be to set up a two stage game. The first stage is about
whether or not to collude, the second stage describes the actual market solution.
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d'Aspremont et al. (1983) point out that a stable cartel will exist, le. there exists
a Nash equilibrium in the first stage of the game where some members choose to
collude. As long as all members are equal, it is arbitrary which members collude,
but in the case of OPEC this should be determined by invoking economic and
cultural conditions.
If the parameter ci in the cost functions differs between countries, we may get
zero production from some of the oligopoly countries. The side payments which
would be necessary for the zero production countries to accept such an outcome
would be substantial. This may not seem particularly realistic. We shall therefore
also study a collusive behaviour where no side payments are allowed.
6.3 Proportionate adjustment of production levels
Without side payments, the most satisfactory solution would be to start by char-
acterizing the efficient outcomes for the oligopoly, i.e. outcomes on the profit
possibility frontier. In addition, we would have to make some additional assump-
tions in order to pick out one particular efficient outcome. One appealing way of
doing this is suggested by Osborne (1976). Under relatively weak conditions he
shows that maximization of joint profits can be supported as a Nash equilibrium
by a quota rale. The cartel must assign a quota to each member, and if one or
more members deviate from this quota, the other members must retaliate to pre-
serve their market share. Hence, this solution combines two attractive features,
joint profit maximization and simple strategies in a Nash equilibrium.
There are, however, two problems with this approach. First, all countries
must have non-zero production in the maximum point. As mentioned above,
with realistic cost functions this will not be the case. Secondly, the strategies
will in general not be creditable, i.e. the solution will not be a perfect equilibrium.
We shall instead use a simpler approach. Our starting point is the Cournot
solution derived in section 6.1. Denote the production levels under this solution
by X; for the colluding members (i.e: i E I). We now assume that the collu-
sion solution is characterized by all colluding members reducing their production
proportionately from the non- cooperative production levels X:. The production
of each colluding member is thus kIC: (i E I), where 0 < k < .1. The non-
cooperating oligopoly members act as Cournot oligopolists like before, so that
(15) remains valid for these n — ni oligopoly members. Together with (11), (16)
and Xi kX; for i E I we therefore have n + 2 equations determining Xi , E and
P for any given value of k.
One way of determining k is to assume that this parameter is chosen so that
the profit of the colluding members is maximized. In other words, k is chosen so
that
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ni = P(k(E X7) E xi)(k E xn - E Ci(kX;)	 (18)
ier	 ie.r	 iEI	 iEl
il maximized for the equilibrium production levels of the non- cooperating
members (i.e. for Xi, i E J). This gives the equation
aP 	P +(kExnrs. =	 (19)
ier	 Ei
An alternative procedure for determinating k would be to start by deriving
the value ki of k which maximizes each of the colluding members' profits. ki is
in other words determined so that
Pvci(E xn + EXi)kiXe — Ci (kX?)
iEl	 iEJ
is maximized for the equilibrium production levels of the non- cooperating
members (i.e. for Xi, i E J). This gives the equations
cifs	 E I	 (20)
Once all ki 's are calculated from these relations and (11), (15) (for i E el),
and (16), k can be chosen as e.g. the median value of k. We shall, however, in
the following stick to the first way of deriving k, i.e. by maximizing the colluding
oligopoly members' total profits.
The principle difference between our two collusive models is thus that in the
case with side payments ((17) prevails), total profits of the colluding members are
maximized without any kind of restrktion on distribution of production between
countries, while in the latter regime ((18), (19) prevail) total output is distributed
among members according to quotas (kX;) consistent with the solution in the
pure Cournot. case.
7 Empirical results
We have implemented the model in the PC-based MODLER software. Exoge-
nous variables on the demand side are taken from a reference simulation on the
WOM model. On the supply' side we distinguish between 13 OPEC-raembers
and Norway, Mexico, Egypt, Oman and Malaysia. The 5 non-OPEC countries
will be refered to as NOPEC. Together the 18 oligopolists have a production
capacity of more than 31 mbd which is 67 percent of oil consumed (actual) in
the non-communist world in 1986.
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The theoretical framework described in sections 3-6 give rise to a large number
of different models, distinguished particularly by which countries are grouped
together in the two collusive cases. In the calculations to be presented in this
paper, we have constructed and simulated 4 different MODLER versions:
1. All 18 countries act as oligopolists
2. OPEC act as a cartel with side payments, NOPEC-countries as oligopolists
3. OPEC acts as a cartel with proportionate reduction of production, NOPEC-
countries act as oligopolies.
4. All 18 countries act together in a cartel with proportionate reductions in
production.	 •
For each of the 18 oil producing countries in the oligopoly we have assessed
the central parameters, i.e gi, ci and the capacity measure Ki, in the marginal
cost function. In the present model version we have assumed values for the con-
stant terms in the marginal cost function (i.e. the c.,— parameters) ranging from
0.5 US$/barrel (Saudi Arabia) to 5 US$/barrel (Ecuador). Our estimates for the
grparameters have magnitudes that imply moderately inverse-L-shaped marginal
cost functions. The countries may be grouped accoording to three different esti-
mates for the grparameters. The values chosen imply that marginal costs increase
by 1, 1.5 and 2.5 US$/barrel respectively above the constant term at 50 percent
capacity utilization. At 90 percent capacity utilization the increase is 2.5, 5 and
8 US$/barrel. This means that the marginal cost functions is more long run
than short run. The capacity variables are fixed close to our estimates of today's
production capacities for the various countries and kept constant throughout the
simulation period. This means that the assessed capacities are not our best guess
estimates of future capacities, rather they constitute a convenieitt way to demon-
strate differences between various forms of market behaviour according to our
model.
The models are simulated for the years 1986, 2000 and 2010.
7.1 Oligopoly
In this model version, mainly because there are quite many oligopoly agents
operating in the market, the outcome is probably not very far from a competitive
equilibrium. Most countries have marginal costs above 95 percent of the oil price,
and only Saudi Arabia has less than 90 percent. The difference between price
and marginal cost differs from Saudi Arabia where marginal cost is 68 percent


























country's production is quite high; the average capacity utilization is close to
90 percent. But there we large differences between the countries; low costs and
low maximum capacity tend to increase capacity utilization. An example of such
a country is Qatar, where low costs and a capacity of only 0.4 mbd leads to a
capacity utilization of 99 percent. High cost countries like Ecuador, Norway and
Gabon have capacity utilization rates less than 70 percent, and "large" countries
with "high" costs like Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia produce just below 80
percent of maximum capacity. The oil price determined by the model for the
base year is 12.60 US$/barrel. As a result of the large total production, the oil
price calculated by this model is lower than what really materialized in 1986.
Towards 2000 and 2010 the mourned increase in incomes (GDP) underlying
the projections imply strong increases in demand. This pushes the capacity
utilization rates close to 100 percent in all countries, even high cost countries
produce more than 97 percent. This puts strong pressure on oil prices, which
rise from 32.70 US$/barrel in 2000 to 86.90 US$/barrel in 2010. Here it should be
emphasized that in the presented calculations we have neither taken into account
effects from competition from other energy sources nor changes in price- and
income responses that probably will occur (especially in developing countries) if
income and prices rise. The_price paths for the various model simulations are
shown in figure 7.1, while the accompanying developments in production from
today's OPEC countries are given in figure 7.2.
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7.2 OPEC cartel with side payments
In this simulation we let the 13 OPEC oligopolists act together in a cartel with.
side payments according to the model outlined in section 6.2. NOPEC coun-
tries continue to act as Cournot oligopolists. The most important difference
from the pure Cournot case is that OPEC reduces production in the base year
and consequently the oil price increases (cf. figure 7.1). OPEC countries pro-
diice 65 percent of their capacity in 1986. According to this theoretical model,
they allocate production as to minimize costs, i.e. so that all countries have
equal marginal cost. The effect on the marginal cost is dramatic compared to
the oligopoly simulation; the common marginal cost for OPEC countries only
constitutes 31 percent of the oil price. This is illustrated in figure 7.3.
The low marginal cost means that countries with low costs produce relatively
large quantities while high cost producers restrict their *production. Ecuador
has a ci (constant term in the marginal cost function) that is only marginally
smaller than the resulting marginal cost in the base year implying a very small
production (cf. relation (6.3)). This country has a capacity utilization of only 7.6
percent i 1986, while Saudi Arabia, having the lowest production cost, produces
at 87 percent of maximum capacity i 1986. The NOPEC countries which act as
Cournot oligopolists increase their production compared to the pure oligopoly
case, and together they have 90 percent capacity utilization in 1986.
In 2000 and 2010 the marginal cost of OPEC is still below the oil price (25
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1966 	 2000 	 2010
Ths fillod part of oviory bar is marginal costs.zrrErt to that loft, NOPEC to tho right
Figure 7.3





and 20 percent of price respectively). However, both price and marginal costs
increase, implying that production increases correspondingly. Because of the
inverse-L shape of the marginal cost functions for these countries, capacities will
be high even at moderate levels of marginal costs. The capacity utilization in
2000 is 87 percent while it is 98 percent in 2010.
All the NOPEC countries. produce close to their capacities in 2000 and 2010.
Oman, with low cost oil fields, produce at fall capacity already in the base year.
All countries within NOPEC are close to 100 percent of capacity in 2000 and
reach 100 percent in 2010. For these countries the marginal costs are close to
the oil price, with the exception of Mexico where marginal costs constitute 90
percent of the price.
The oil price is more than 40 percent higher in the base year in this simulation
than in the pure oligopoly case. In 2000 the difference has decreased to 18.5
percent and in 2010 the total supply is more or less identical to the oligopoly
case which also means that the oil price is about the same.
7.3 OPEC cartel with proportionate reduction of supplies
As described in section 6.3, the other collusive model which we analyze is a hy-
pothetical case where all the OPEC oligopolists reduce their production by the
same percent relatively to the market equilibrium in the pure Cournot solution.
An important implication of this regime is that marginal costs for OPEC mem-
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bers no longer are equalized, so that the allocation of total production within the
cartel is not carried out in the most efficient way. The z.eduction in production
compared to the pure oligopoly case is 27 percent in the base year, which is very
close to the reduced output in the cartel model with side payments. This further-
more implies that both the oil price and the total supply from OPEC are almost
identical in the two collusive models. The important difference is the distribution
of production within OPEC.
For non-OPEC producers the intuitively reasonable lesson of this outcome
is that what really matters from their point of view is that OPEC act together
in their struggle for stabilizing and possibly raising the oil price. How such
coordinate efforts are obtained within OPEC is not that important.
7.4 A cartel model including all 18 oil producers
As mentioned above, during the last years coordinate efforts have been under-
taken and some tacit agreements have been obtained even between OPEC and
some non-OPEC oil producers. Even though these contacts obviously are diffi-
cult to describe in any formal manner, the existence of such agreements should
create some interest for the present model version.
When the 5 NOPEC countries are included in the cartel, its market power
increases considerably. This is exploited by the cartel; total output from the 18
countries is reduced by 1/3 compared to the oligopoly case in the base year, and
by 18 percent from the OPEC-cartel solution. The price is 22.40 US$/barrel in
the base year, an increase of 78 percent compared to the oligopoly case (figure
7.1).
In the two OPEC-cartel simulations we saw above that the monopoly power
of the cartel almost vanishes towards 2010, reflected in the observation that the
oil price is insignificantly above the value in the pure Cournot case. In the present
simulation, however, output is reduced in 2010 by 15 percent, while the oil price
in the same year is increased from the Cournot solution by 40 percent (figure
7.1).
8 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework for analyzing various kinds of
strategic behaviour and collusive behaviour in the crude oil market. The analysis
is preliminary, and in particular the empirical simulations should be regarded
mainly as demonstrations of the framework and differences between the various
strategic models. In these calculations we have e.g. not taken proper account
to the presence of "back-stop" prices and the possibility that income- and price
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elasticities in LDC countries will change as a results of income growth. Both
these factors will, when implemented, tend to create more realistic levels for the
oil price than in the numerical examples presented in this paper. As mentioned
above, we intend to extend the model by relations describing producers decisions
with respect to capacity levels.
As supplements to existing simulation models which are being used for pro-
ji.cting the evolution in the crude oil market (among which we may mention the
WOM model), we believe that such a framework may show to be very useful as a
tool for analyzing market developments. This because the models explicitly build
on the fact that strategic behaviour is highly present in the oil market. Used with
care and supplemented with more detailed knowledge to the oil market, we thus
regard it as a step towards a better understanding of events in this market.
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